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ABSTRACT
Recent research brought awareness of the issue of bots on social
media and the significant risks of mass manipulation of public opin-
ion in the context of political discussion. In this work, we leverage
Twitter to study the discourse during the 2018 US midterm elections
and analyze social bot activity and interactions with humans. We
collected 2.6 million tweets for 42 days around the election day from
nearly 1 million users. We use the collected tweets to answer three
research questions: (i) Do social bots lean and behave according to
a political ideology? (ii) Can we observe different strategies among
liberal and conservative bots? (iii) How effective are bot strategies?
We show that social bots can be accurately classified according
to their political leaning and behave accordingly. Conservative bots
share most of the topics of discussion with their human counterparts,
while liberal bots show less overlap and a more inflammatory attitude.
We studied bot interactions with humans and observed different
strategies. Finally, we measured bots embeddedness in the social
network and the effectiveness of their activities. Results show that
conservative bots are more deeply embedded in the social network
and more effective than liberal bots at exerting influence on humans.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, social media have become the conventional
communication channel to socialize, share opinions, and access the
news. Accuracy, truthfulness, and authenticity of the shared content
are necessary ingredients to maintain a healthy online discussion.
However, in recent times, social media have been dealing with a
considerable growth of false content and fake accounts. The re-
sulting wave of misinformation (and disinformation) highlights the
pitfalls of social media networks and their potential harms to several
constituents of our society, ranging from politics to public health.
In fact, social media networks have been used for malicious pur-
poses to a great extent [11]. Various studies raised awareness about
the risk of mass manipulation of public opinion, especially in the con-
text of political discussion. Disinformation campaigns [2, 5, 12, 14–
16, 21, 23, 25, 29] and social bots [3, 4, 20, 22, 24, 28, 30, 31] have
been indicated as factors contributing to social media manipulation.
The 2016 US Presidential election represents a prime example
of the significant perils of mass manipulation of political discourse.
Badawy et al. [1] studied the Russian interference in the election
and the activity of Russian trolls on Twitter. Im et al. [17] suggested
that troll accounts are still active to these days. The presence of
social bots does not show any sign of decline [10, 31] despite the
attempts from social network providers to suspend suspected, ma-
licious accounts. Various research efforts have been focusing on
the analysis, detection, and countermeasures development against
social bots. Ferrara et al. [13] highlighted the consequences asso-
ciated with bot activity in social media. The online conversation
related to the 2016 US presidential election was further examined
[3] to quantify the extent of social bots activity. More recently, Stella
et al. [26] discussed bots’ strategy of targeting influential humans to
manipulate online conversation during the Catalan referendum for
independence, whereas Shao et al. [24] analyzed the role of social
bots in spreading articles from low credibility sources. Deb et al.
[10] focused on the 2018 US Midterms elections with the objective
to find instances of voter suppression.
In this work, we investigate social bots behavior by analyzing
their activity, strategy, and interactions with humans. We aim to
answer the following research questions (RQs) regarding social bots
behavior during the 2018 US Midterms election.
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RQ1: Do social bots lean and behave according to a political ide-
ology? We investigate whether social bots can be classified
based on their political inclination into liberal or conservative
leaning. Further, we explore to what extent they act similarly
to the corresponding human counterparts.
RQ2: Can we observe different strategies among liberal and con-
servative bots? We examine the differences between social
bot strategies to mimic humans and infiltrate political discus-
sion. For this purpose, we measure bot activity in terms of
volume and frequency of posts, interactions with humans, and
embeddedness in the social network.
RQ3: Are bot strategies effective? We introduce four metrics to
estimate the effectiveness of bot strategies and to evaluate the
degree of human interplay with social bots.
We leverage Twitter to capture the political discourse during the
2018 US midterm elections. We collected 2.6 million tweets for
42 days around election day from nearly 1 million users. We then
explore collected data and attain the following findings:
• We show that social bots are embedded in each political side
and behave accordingly. Conservative bots abide by the topic
discussed by the human counterpart more than liberal bots,
which in turn exhibit a more provocative attitude.
• We examined bots’ interactions with humans and observed
different strategies. Conservative bots stand in a more central
social network position, and divide their interactions between
humans and other conservative bots, whereas liberal bots
focused mainly on the interplay with the human counterparts.
• We measured the effectiveness of these strategies and recog-
nized the strategy of conservative bots as the most effective
in terms of influence exerted on human users.
DATA
In this study, we use Twitter to investigate the partisan behavior
of malicious accounts during the 2018 US midterm elections. For
this purpose, we carried out a data collection from the month prior
(October 6, 2018) to two weeks after (November 19, 2018) the day
of the election. We kept the collection running after the election
day as several races remained unresolved. We employed the Python
module Twyton to collect tweets through the Twitter Streaming
API using the following keywords as a filter: 2018midtermelections,
2018midterms, elections, midterm, and midtermelections. As a result,
we gathered 2.7 million tweets, whose IDs are publicly available
for download.1 From this set, we first removed any duplicate tweet,
which may have been captured by accidental redundant queries to
the Twitter API. Then, we excluded all the tweets not written in
English language. Despite the majority of the tweets were in English,
and to a lesser degree in Spanish (3,177 tweets), we identified 59
languages in the collected data. Thus, we inspected tweets from other
countries and removed them as they were out of the context of this
study. In particular, we filtered out tweets related to the Cameroon
election, the Democratic Republic of the Congo election, the Biafra
call for Independence, democracy in Kenya (#democracyKE), to
the two major political parties in India (BJP and UPA), and college
midterm exams. Overall, we retain nearly 2.6 millions tweets, whose
aggregate statistics are reported in Table 1.
1https://github.com/A-Deb/midterms
Table 1: Dataset statistics
Statistic Count
# of Tweets 452,288
# of Retweets 1,869,313
# of Replies 267,973
# of Users 997,406
METHODOLOGY
Bot Detection
Nowadays, bot detection is a fundamental asset for understanding
social media manipulation and, more specifically, to reveal malicious
accounts. In the last few years, the problem of detecting automated
accounts gathered both attention and concern [13], also bringing a
wide variety of approaches to the table [7, 8, 19, 27]. While increas-
ingly sophisticated techniques keep emerging [19], in this study, we
employ the widely used Botometer.2
Botometer is a machine learning-based tool developed by Indiana
University [9, 28] to detect social bots in Twitter. It is based on an
ensemble classifier [6] that aims to provide an indicator, namely bot
score, used to classify an account either as a bot or as a human. To
feed the classifier, the Botometer API extracts about 1,200 features
related to the Twitter account under analysis. These features fall in
six broad categories and characterize the account’s profile, friends,
social network, temporal activity patterns, language, and sentiment.
Botometer outputs a bot score: the lower the score, the higher the
probability that the user is human. In this study we use version v3 of
Botometer, which brings some innovations, as detailed in [31]. Most
importantly, the bot scores are now rescaled (and not centered around
0.5 anymore) through a non-linear re-calibration of the model.
In Figure 1, we depict the bot score distribution of the 997,406
distinct users in our datasets. The distribution exhibits a right skew:
most of the probability mass is in the range [0, 0.2] and some peaks
can be noticed around 0.3. Prior studies used the 0.5 threshold to
separate humans from bots. However, according to the re-calibration
introduced in Botometer v3 [31], along with the emergence of in-
creasingly more sophisticated bots, we here lower the bot score
threshold to 0.3 (i.e., a user is labeled as a bot if the score is above
0.3). This threshold corresponds to the same level of sensitivity
setting of 0.5 in prior versions of Botometer (cf. Fig 5 from [31]).
According to this choice, we classified 21.1% of the accounts as
bots, which in turn generated 30.6% of the tweets in our data set.
Overall, Botometer did not return a score for 35,029 users that corre-
sponds to 3.5% of the accounts. We used the Twitter API to further
inspect them. Interestingly, 99.4% of these accounts were suspended
by Twitter, whereas the remaining percentage of users protected their
tweets turning on the privacy settings of their accounts.
Political Ideology Inference
In parallel to the bot detection analysis, we examine the political
leaning of both bots and humans in our dataset. To classify users
based on their political ideology, we rely on the political leaning of
the media outlets they share. We make use of a list of partisan media
outlets released by third-party organizations, such as AllSides3 and
2https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/
3https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-ratings
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Figure 1: Bot score distribution
Media Bias/Fact Check.4 We combine liberal and liberal-center me-
dia outlets into one list (composed of 641 outlets) and conservative
and conservative-center into another (composed of 398 outlets). To
cross reference these media URLs with the URLs in the Twitter
dataset, we need to get the expanded URLs for most of the links in
the dataset, as most of them are shortened. However, this process is
quite time-consuming, thus, we decided to rank the top 5,000 URLs
by popularity and retrieve the long version only for those. These top
5,000 URLs accounts for more than 254K, or more than 1/3 of all
the URLs in the dataset. After cross-referencing the 5,000 extended
URLs with the media URLs, we observe that 32,115 tweets in the
dataset contain a URL that points to one of the liberal media outlets
and 25,273 tweets with a URL pointing to one of the conservative
media outlets.
To label Twitter accounts as liberal or conservative, we use a
polarity rule based on the number of tweets they produce with links
to liberal or conservative sources. Thereby, if an account has more
tweets with URLs pointing to liberal sources, it is labeled as liberal
and vice versa. Although the overwhelming majority of accounts
include URLs that are either liberal or conservative, we remove any
account that has equal number of tweets from each side. Our final
set of labeled accounts includes 38,920 users.
Finally, we use label propagation to classify the remaining ac-
counts in a similar way to previous work (cf. [1]). For this purpose,
we construct a social network based on the retweets exchanged be-
tween users. The nodes of the retweet network are the users, which
are connected by a direct link if one user retweeted a post of an-
other user. To validate results of the label propagation algorithm,
we apply a stratified cross (5-fold) validation to a set composed of
38,920 seed accounts. We train the algorithm using 80% of the seeds
and we evaluate the performance on the remaining 20%. Finally,
we compute precision and recall by reiterating the validation of the
5-folds. Both precision and recall scores show value around 0.89 and
validate the proposed approach. Moreover, since we combine liberal
and liberal-center into one list (same for conservatives), we can see
that the algorithm is not only labeling the far liberal or conservative
correctly, which is a relatively easier task, but it is performing well
on the liberal/conservative center as well.
4https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
Table 2: Users and tweets statistics
Liberal Conservative
Humans 386,391 (38.7%) 122,761 (12.3%)
Bots 82,118 (8.2%) 49,488 (4.9%)
(a) Number (percentage) of users per group
Liberal Conservative
Humans 957,726 (37.0%) 476,231 (18.4%)
Bots 288,659 (11.1%) 364,727 (14.1%)
(b) Number (percentage) of tweets per group
Bot Activity Effectiveness
We next introduce four metrics to estimate bot effectiveness and, at
the same time, measure to what extent humans rely upon, and interact
with the content generated by social bots. Thereby, we propose the
following metrics:
• Retweet Pervasiveness (RTP) measures the intrusiveness of
bot-generated content in human-generated retweets:
RTP =
no. of human retweets from bot tweets
no. of human retweets
(1)
• Reply Rate (RR) measures the percentage of replies given by
humans to social bots:
RR =
no. of human replies to bot tweets
no. of human replies
(2)
• Human to Bot Rate (H2BR) quantifies human interaction with
bots over all the human activities in the social network:
H2BR = no. of humans interaction with bots
no. of humans activity
, (3)
where the numerator counts for human replies/retweets to/of
bots generated content, while the denominator is the sum of
the number of human tweets, retweets, and replies.
• Tweet Success Rate (TSR) is the percentage of tweets gener-
ated by bots that obtained at least one retweet by a human:
TSR =
no. of tweet retweeted at least once by a human
no. of bots tweets
(4)
RESULTS
Next, we address the research questions discussed in the Introduction.
We examine social bot partisanship and, accordingly, we analyze
bots’ strategies and measure the effectiveness of their actions.
RQ1: Bot Political Leaning
The combination of the outcome from the bot detection algorithm
and the political ideology inference allowed us to identify four
groups of users, namely Liberal Humans, Conservative Humans,
Liberal Bots, and Conservative Bots. In Table 2a, we show the per-
centage of users per group. Note that percentages do not sum up to
100 as either the political ideology inference was not able to classify
every user, or Botometer did not return a score, as we previously
mentioned. In particular, we were able to assign a political leaning
to 63% of bots and 67% of humans. We find that the liberal user
population is almost three times larger than the conservative coun-
terpart. This discrepancy is also present, but less evident, for the bot
accounts, which exhibit an unbalance in favor of liberal bots. Further,
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(b) 25-core decomposition
(a) 10-core decomposition
Figure 2: Political discussion over (a) the 10-core, and (b) the 25-core decomposition of the retweet network. Each node represents a
user, while links represent retweets. Links with weight (i.e., frequency of occurrence) less than 2 are hidden to minimize visual clutter.
Blue nodes represent liberal accounts, while red nodes indicate conservative users. Darker tones (blue and red) depict bots, while
lighter tones (cyan and pink) relate to humans, and the few green nodes represent unclassified accounts. The link takes the same color
of the source node (author of the retweet), whereas node size is proportional to the in-degree of the user.
Table 3: Top 20 hashtags generated by liberal and conservative
bots. Hashtags in bold are not present in the top 50 hashtags
used by the corresponding human group.
Liberal Bots Conservative Bots
#MAGA #BrowardCounty
#NovemberisComing #MAGA
#TheResistance #StopTheSteal
#GOTV #WalkAway
#Florida #WednesdayWisdom
#ImpeachTrump #PalmBeachCounty
#Russia #Florida
#VoteThemOut #QAnon
#unhackthevote #KAG
#FlipTheHouse #IranRegime
#RegisterToVote #Tehran
#Resist #WWG1WGA
#ImpeachKavanaugh #Louisiana
#GOP #BayCounty
#MeToo #AmericaFirst
#AMJoy #DemocratsAreDangerous
#txlege #StopTheCaravan
#FlipTheSenate #Blexit
#CultureOfCorruption #VoteDemsOut
#TrumpTrain #VoterFraud
we investigate the suspended accounts to inspect the consistency of
this result. The inference algorithm attributed a political ideology to
63% of these accounts, which in turn show once again the liberal
advantage over the conservative faction (45% vs. 18%).
Figure 2 shows two k-core decomposition graphs of the retweet
network. In a k-core, each node is connected with at least k other
nodes. Figures 2a and 2b capture the 10-core and 25-core decom-
position, respectively. Here, nodes represent Twitter users and link
represent retweets among them. We indicate as source the user that
retweeted the tweet of a target user. Colors represent the political
ideology, with darker colors (red and blue) being bots and lighter
colors (cyan and pink) being human users; size represents the in-
degree. The graph is visualized using a force-directed layout [18],
where nodes repulse each other, while edges attract their nodes. In
our setting, this means that users are spatially distributed accord-
ing to the amount of retweets between each other. The result is a
network naturally split into two communities, where each side is
almost entirely populated by users with the same political ideology.
This polarization is also reflected by bots, which are embedded,
with humans, in each political side. Two facts are worth noting: (i)
as k increases, the left k-core appears to disrupt, while the right
k-core remains well connected; and, (ii) as k increases, bots appear
to outnumber humans, suggesting that bots may populate areas of
the retweet network that are more central and better connected.
Next, we examine the topics discussed by social bots and com-
pare them with the human counterparts. Table 3 shows the top 20
hashtags utilized by liberal and conservative bots. We highlight (in
bold) the hashtags that are not present in the top 50 hashtags used
by the corresponding human group to point out the similarities and
differences among the groups. In this table, we do not take into ac-
count general hashtags (such as #elections, #midterms, #democrats,
#liberals, #VoteRed(or Blue)ToSaveAmerica, and #Trump) as (i)
the overlap between bot and human hashtags is noticeable when
these terms are considered, and (ii) we aim to narrow the analy-
sis to specific topics and inflammatory content, inspired by [26].
Moreover, we used an enlarged subset of hashtags for the human
groups to further strengthen the differences and, at the same time,
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Table 4: Average network centrality measures
Liberal Conservative
Humans 2.66 ·10−6 4.14 ·10−6
Bots 3.70 ·10−6 7.81 ·10−6
(a) Out-degree centrality
Liberal Conservative
Humans 2.52 ·10−6 4.24 ·10−6
Bots 2.53 ·10−6 6.22 ·10−6
(b) In-degree centrality
to better understand the objective of social bots. Although bots and
humans share the majority of hashtags, two main differences can be
noticed. First, conservative bots abide by the corresponding human
counterpart more than the liberal bots. Second, liberal bots focus on
more inflammatory and provocative content (e.g., #ImpeachTrump,
#ImpeachKavanaugh, #FlipTheSenate) w.r.t. conservative bots.
RQ2: Bot Activity and Strategies
In this Section, we investigate social bot activity based on their
political leaning. We explore their strategies in interacting with
humans and the degree of embeddedness in the social network.
Table 2b depicts the number (and percentage) of tweets generated
by each group. Despite the group composed of conservative bots
is the smallest in terms of number of accounts, it produced more
tweets than liberal bots and closely approaches the number of tweets
generated by the human counterpart. The resulting tweet per user
ratio shows that conservative bots produce 7.4 tweets per account,
which is more than twice the ratio related to the liberal bots (3.5),
almost the double of the human counterpart (3.9), and nearly three
times the ratio of liberal humans (2.5).
To investigate the interplay between bots and humans, we con-
sider the previously described retweet network. Figure 3 shows the
interaction among the four groups. We maintain the same color map-
ping described before, with darker color (on the bottom) representing
bots and lighter color (on top) indicating humans. Node size is pro-
portional to the percentage of accounts in each group, while edge
size is proportional to the percentage of interactions between each
group. In Figure 3a, this percentage is computed considering all the
interactions in the retweet network, while in Figure 3b we consider
each group separately, therefore, the edge size gives a measure of the
group propensity to interact with the other groups. Consistently with
Figure 2, we observe that there is a limited amount of interaction be-
tween the two political sides. The majority of interactions are either
intra-group or between groups of the same political leaning. From
Figure 3b, we can observe that the two bot factions adopted different
strategies. Conservative bots balanced their interactions by retweet-
ing group members 43% of the time, and the human counterpart 52%
of the time. On the other hand, liberal bots mainly retweeted liberal
humans (71% of the time) and limited the intra-group interactions
to the 22% of their retweet activity. Interestingly, conservative hu-
mans interacted with the conservative bots (28% of the time) much
more than the liberal counterpart (16%) with the liberal bots. To
better understand these results and to measure the effectiveness of
both the strategies, in the next Section we evaluate the four metrics
introduced earlier in this paper.
Bots
Humans
(a) Overall interactions (b) Group-based interactions
Figure 3: Interactions according to political ideology
Figure 4: k-core decomposition, liberal vs. conservative users
Finally, we examine the degree of embeddedness of both humans
and bots within the retweet network. For this purpose, we first com-
pute different network centrality measures, and then we adopt the
k-core decomposition technique to identify the most central nodes
in the graph. In Table 4, we show the average out- and in-degree
centrality for each group of users. Out-degree centrality measures the
quantity of outgoing links, while in-degree centrality considers the
number of of incoming links. Both of these measures are normalized
by the maximum possible degree of the graph. Overall, conservative
groups have higher centrality measures than the liberal ones. We can
notice that conservative bots achieve the highest values both for the
out- and in-degree centrality. To further investigate bots embedded-
ness in the social network, we use the k-core decomposition. The
objective of this technique is to determine the set of nodes deeply
embedded in a graph. The k-core is a subgraph of the original graph
in which every node has a degree equal to or greater than a given
value k . We extracted the k-cores from the retweet network by vary-
ing k in the range between 0 and 30. Figure 4 depicts the percentage
of liberal and conservative users as a function of k. We can notice
that, as k grows, the fraction of conservative bots increases, while
the percentage of liberal bots remains almost stationary. On the hu-
man side, the liberal fraction drops with k , whereas the conservative
percentage remains approximately steady. Overall, conservative bots
sit in a more central position in the social network and are more
deeply connected if compared to the liberal counterpart.
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Table 5: Bot effectiveness
Metric Liberal Bots Conservative Bots
RT P 14.1% 25.6%
RR 4.5% 15.5%
H2BR 12.3% 23.2%
TSR 35.3% 35.0%
RQ3: Bot Effectiveness
In this Section, we aim to estimate the effectiveness of bot strategies
and measure to what extent humans rely upon, and interact with the
content generated by social bots. We examine the effect of bot activ-
ities by means of the four metrics described in Section Bot Activity
Effectiveness. We evaluate each political side separately, thus, we
compare the interaction between bots and humans with the same
leaning. In Table 5, we depict the results for each group of bots.
Diverse aspects are worthy of consideration. We can observe that
conservative bots are significantly more effective than the liberal
counterpart. Although the TSRs of the red and blue bots are com-
parable, the gap between the two groups, with respect to the other
metrics, is significant. To carefully interpret this result, it should also
be noticed that (i) the TSR is inversely proportional to the number
of tweets generated by bots, and (ii) conservative bots tweeted more
than the liberal counterpart, as depicted in Table 2b. Overall, conser-
vative bots received a larger degree of interaction with (and likely
trust from) human users. In fact, conservative humans interacted
with the bot counterpart almost twice with retweets (RTP), and more
than three times with replies (RR) if compared to the liberal group.
Finally, the H2BR highlights a remarkable amount of human activi-
ties that involve social bots: almost one in four actions performed by
conservative humans goes towards red bots.
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
In this work, we conducted an investigation to analyze social bots
activity during the 2018 US Midterm election. We showed that social
bots are embedded in each political wing and behave accordingly.
We observed different strategies between conservative and liberal
bots. Specifically, conservative bots stand in a more central position
in the social network and abide by the topic discussed by the hu-
man counterpart more than the liberal bots, which in turn exhibit
an inflammatory attitude. Further, conservative bots balanced their
interaction with humans and bots of the red wing, whereas liberal
bots focused mainly on the interplay with the human counterpart.
Finally, we inspected the effectiveness of these strategies and
recognized the strategy of the conservative bots as the most effective.
However, these results open the door to further interpretation and
discussion. Are conservative bots more effective because of their
strategy or because of the human ineptitude to distinguish their
nature? This, and related analysis, will be expanded in future work.
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